Research

Book

Paying for the Party: How Fundraising Demands Lead to Less Productive and Less Representative Legislatures
University of Chicago Press (Chicago Studies in American Politics)

Lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures across the United States spend enormous amounts of time and effort fundraising, not just for their own seats but for the party. Whether dialing for dollars or hosting high-priced fundraising events, the pursuit of campaign funds is now a massive part of the American legislator’s job description. What explains this transformation, and what are the consequences for public policy?

Paying for the Party introduces new theory and new data to answer these questions. The book shows that state legislative party organizationsβ€”Democratic and Republican caucuses in capitols across the countryβ€”are responsible for turning their members into single-minded seekers of money. Parties reward legislators who contribute the most with powerful leadership and committee positions. Consequently, the members who now hold these agenda-setting positions are increasingly neither the most productive nor knowledgeable lawmakers, but rather those who can raise the most money. And when legislators are asked to raise more money, they skip committee hearings for fundraising events, enacting fewer substantive policies as a result. Paying for the Party shows that parties in contemporary American legislatures have hollowed out the policymaking capacity of their institutions and empowered a decidedly non-representative set of legislators.


Journal Articles and Other Work


“Measuring Partisanship and Representation in Online Congressional Communication” with Michael Heseltine, Robert Alvarez, Maya Fitch, Lucas Lothamer, and Elizabeth Simas
Conditionally Accepted, American Political Science Review

πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Partisan and Ideological Bias Among the Attentive Public: Evidence from Witness Slips in the Illinois General Assembly” with Michael Pomirchy
Conditionally Accepted, Legislative Studies Quarterly

πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Ambition and Conflict in State Legislatures” with Christian Fong
Forthcoming, Journal of Politics

πŸ“–Early Access Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Responsive Rhetoric: Evidence from Congressional Redistricting” with Jaclyn Kaslovsky
2025, Legislative Studies Quarterly

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Promoting Conspiracy Theories Strategically” with David Hilden
2025, Quarterly Journal of Political Science

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Immigration and Political Incorporation: Asian American Representation in State Legislatures” with Tanika Raychaudhuri
2025, State Politics and Policy Quarterly

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Comparing Leviathans: Agenda Influence in State Legislatures, 2011 to 2023” with Boris Shor
2024, Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Local Newspapers and Ideological Accountability in US House Elections” with Brandice Canes-Wrone
2023. In Accountability Reconsidered: Voters, Interests, and Information in US Policymaking, Cambridge University Press

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Fighting for Majorities? Explaining the Development of Caucus Fundraising in American Legislatures”
2022, Journal of Politics

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version

“Out of Step and Still in Congress? The Electoral Consequences of Incumbent and Challenger Positioning across Time” with Brandice Canes-Wrone
2022, Quarterly Journal of Political Science

πŸ“–Published Version πŸ“„ Ungated Version


Select Working Papers


“Credit Claiming and Accountability for Legislative Effectiveness” with Elizabeth Simas, David Hilden, and Jamie Wright


“Opening the Gates: Interest Group Influence on Partisan Agenda Control” with Boris Shor